In this paper, we study values for TU-games which satisfy three classical properties: Linearity, efficiency and symmetry. We give the general analytical form of these values and their relation with the Shapley value and the Egalitarian value.
Introduction
The main result on values for TU-games is due to Shapley (1953) who de…nes a value which satis…es four properties: linearity, e¢ ciency, symmetry and the dummy axiom. The aim of this paper is to study and characterize values which satisfy the …rst three classic properties. We obtain almost the same results as Hernandez-Lamoneda, Juarez and Sanchez-Sanchez (2008) which, independently, work in the same topic. We will focus our analysis on the discriminate properties of values to obtain new axiomatization of some classic values.
Notations and preliminaries
Let N be a …nite set of n players, we denote by: P (N ) the set of subsets of N and 2 N the set of non empty subsets of N:
R the set of real numbers and (N ) the set of automorphisms of N .
An n-person TU-game on N is a pair (N; v) where v is a mapping from P (N ) to R such that v(;) = 0 will denote the 2 n 1 dimension linear space of all n person TU-game on N .
A value ' is a mapping from to R n . ' (v) = (' i (v)) i2N is a vector of distribution of the payo¤s obtained in v.
Let us give some properties of values ;
' is linear if : 8v; w 2 ; 8 ;
where
' is covariant if : 8v 2 ; 8 2 R; 8 2 R n ; '( v + ) = '(v) + where v + is de…ned by :
' preserves additive games if : 8 2 R n ; '( (:)) = where (:) is de…ned by :
Let be the set of n + 1 vectors of real numbers A = (A(k)) k=0;::;n such that A(0) is a …xed real number and A(n) = 1:
For each element A of , we de…ne the value A by :
Let us give two others expressions of A in the following lemma :
We can therefore deduce the following relation between A and the Shapley value denoted Shap.
Let us denoted by the set of values A for all elements A on .
Geometric properties of
It is easy to prove the following results :
is a convex set and furthermore:
Proposition 2 : is a n 1 dimension a¢ ne set. Furthermore A = (A(k)) k=1;::;n 1 is a vector of coordinates of 0 in the basis k k=1;::;n 1 where 0 is the egalitarian value and k is de…ned by : 
The discrimination on values of can be done in two di¤erent and equivalent ways :
-a particular vector A = (A(k)) k=0;::;n of is given and therefore we obtain a speci…c value A :
-a property, called discriminate property, is added to linearity, e¢ ciency and symmetry to obtain an unique element of :
Let us introduce the non negativity and the marginalism as discriminate properties through the following results : Let ' be a value, A = (A(k)) k=0;::;n a vector in , a real number :
' satis…es the zero player property if :
' satis…es the A zero player property if :
We obtain the following result :
Theorem 4 : ' is linear, e¢ cient, symmetric and satis…es the A zero player property if and only if ' = (1 ) 0 + A where 0 is the egalitarian value.
We can deduce the characterization of egalitarian value when = 0, result due to Van den Brink (2007) .
The last discriminate property in this paper can be seen as the dual of the previous one and is de…ned by : 
Conclusion
The paper has outlined the properties of the class of values which are linear, e¢ cient and symmetric. In particular, it has been proved that the class is an a¢ ne linear space for which a "canonical" basis has been identi…ed. On the one hand, this has been helpful in bringing out some common analytic expression of all the values in the class. We have obtained that every value in the class can be put in the random order form, similar to the well-known expression of the Shapley value. On the other hand, we have explained conditions for a given value which is presumed as member of the class to satisfy some basic properties as well as recasting in simplify and extensive terms some well-known results.
6 Appendix Lemma 1 :
Corollary 1 : Suppose A(k) 0 8k = 1; 2; :::n; for any i2N; and for any v; w 2 ; v(S) w(S) 8S 3 i
) for all k = 1; 2; :::
Conversely, suppose A is monotonic; for any i 2 N , for all k = 1; 2; :::; n, there exists at least one coalition S i N such that : 
